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Abstract
Following a currency crisis in late 1997 which caused widespread corporate failures, Korea enacted
a number of legislations to improve the transparency of corporate governance structure. While laudable
in their empowerment of minority shareholder rights, such laws nonetheless had a major flaw in that they
did not provide countervailing protections for director discretion. Consequently, derivative suits seeking
director liability rapidly multiplied, and in several high-profile cases directors were held accountable for
enormous sums based on apparently mere errors in judgment.
Risk taking is the centerpiece of entrepreneurial capitalism.  And directors bear the ultimate
managerial authority for the corporation. However, by indiscriminately imposing personal accountability
on directors for inherently risky business judgments, the current Korean laws undercut the fundamental
purpose of a corporation, which is to maximize profit based on the principle of risk-and-return
proportionality. This is worrisome given the current position of Korea in the global economy and its
stated goal to upgrade its laws and institutions to a level that will be internationally competitive.
As a partial solution to this conundrum, this article proposes the adoption of the business judgment
rule as developed in the Anglo-American jurisprudence. In its simplest form, the rule represents the
court’s reluctance to second-guess the business decisions of directors, absent loyalty issues. While the rule
has many context-based variations, incorporating as a judicial doctrine the rule at least in its basic form
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would be a valuable starting point for redirecting Korean corporate laws in the right direction.
Incorporating the specific mechanics of the rule, such as the presumption-based shifting of the evidentiary
burden and gradated standards of liability, requires an approach tailored to Korea’s legal structure and
traditions concerning director duties and liabilities. However, Korean judges have a wide discretion in
statutory interpreation and should be able find innovative ways to bring the Korean corporate
jurisprudence in substantial convergence with international norms.
For example, Articles 383-3 and 399 of the Commercial Code can be read to hold directors liable
only in the case of an abuse of discretion or a grossly negligent performance of their duties. The court can
also require that the plaintiff in a director liability suit to overcome the presumption of due care as well as
establish the foreseeability of harm under Articles 390 and 393 of the Civil Code. These may not be
complete solutions. However, given the current anti-business sentiment among the public and the
consequent unlikelihood of a major statutory overhaul any time soon, such judicial approach probably
would be the most practicable solution. 
In sum, incorporating the business judgment rule into the current Korean corporate jurisprudence is both
desirable and doable as a matter of both law and policy.
I.  Introduction
The batch of corporate governance legislations Korea adopted in response to the
financial crisis in 1997 presents an interesting case study of a reform gone awry. They,
like most other reforms, started with the best of intentions, namely, that of reinforcing
institutional checks against management excess, widely perceived to be the main
culprit for the unduly high debt ratio among Korean corporations and the subsequent
contagion of corporate failures following the currency crisis. As a result, a host of
checks-and-balances mechanisms were introduced, most notably an eased standing
requirement for bringing a shareholder derivative action and the mandatory inclusion
of outside directors in publicly listed corporations. 
To the extent that such measures were intended as a way to raise the standard of
Korean corporate governance to an “internationally competitive” level, as was the
stated legislative objective, they were steps in the right direction. But a few critical
elements went missing, perhaps due to fact that the measures were enacted in an
overzealous drive to appease the investors and the general public in uproar as to the
sorry condition of the management process in Korean corporations.  Most importantly,
the measures failed to include any mechanism to indemnify or otherwise protect the
outside directors from frivolous lawsuits made possible by the very same reform
package that called for the institution of outside directors. 
Such oversight carries enormous practical implications. First of all, the number of
derivative suits has rapidly multiplied following the enactment of the reform measures,
with some judgments against the directors reaching astronomical heights in the
monetary damages ordered. The situation is most likely to worsen with the ongoing
infusion of a great deal more lawyers into Korean society and the introduction of class
action systems. What this means is that Korean companies will be deprived of honest
and competent directors precisely at a time when they are most needed. As it faces a
set of ever tighter competitive pressures in the form of the international “scissor”
effect, Korea needs all the help it can get, including aggressive managers who are
willing to take risks in search of the optimal return. But the looming presence of
litigation, coupled with the lack of any clear judicial standards to guide director
behavior, threatens to create just the opposite effect.  
Legal reform is a tricky business, especially when carried out in haste. And as it
stands, the state of Korean corporate governance laws is like that of a half-formed
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wing that does not quite fly and, by unnecessarily stifling the entrepreneurial spirit,
even threatens to kill the goose that lays the golden egg. Korea therefore critically
needs a countervailing set of director-friendly measures to restore the balance of
corporate governance rules, or at least to prevent the well-meaning and hard-working
directors from being unduly and indiscriminately punished along with the few bad
apples.
One such measure this paper examines is the feasibility of adopting the business
judgment rule as practiced in the Anglo-American jurisprudence. Of course, there are
many other candidates for analysis. For instance, director indemnification statutes and
the D&O insurance are also measures commonly used in other countries to protect the
corporate directors.  
However, the business judgment rule is the most interesting of the bunch.  First, its
nature as primarily a judicial doctrine poses an analytical challenge in that the
likelihood of success for its incorporation depends largely on the “embeddedness”
question of Korea’s statutory framework governing director duties and liabilities. In
other words, a feasibility study must be first conducted to see whether and to what
extent the business judgment rule will work within the constraints of existing Korean
laws. This problem, as we shall see, becomes especially complicated given the
structural differences between the Korean legal system, which is based on civil law
traditions, and the Anglo-American common law, upon which the business judgment
rule is premised. That some Korean judges are already experimenting with the notion
of the business judgment rule makes a comprehensive analysis of its applicability that
much more urgent.
This paper is structured along the following questions: (i) why Korea should adopt
the business judgment rule; (ii) what are the statutory constraints on its formal
adoption; (iii) to what extent has the rule been incorporated into Korean jurisprudence;
and (iv) what further needs to be done. Accordingly, Part I of this essay outlines the
uneven development of recent Korean laws on corporate governance and the reasons
why director-protective mechanisms are necessary. Part II discusses the business
judgment rule itself in terms of its content and rationales as commonly understood in
the Anglo-American jurisprudence. Part III analyzes the embedded Korean statutory
framework governing director duties and liabilities, with a particular view to the
possible forms of resistance it may pose to the systematic adoption of the business
judgment rule. Part IV examines the extent to which the business judgment rule has
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already been incorporated into Korean jurisprudence. Part V explores the ways in
which the judges may take a more active and innovative role in turning the rule into
that of greater general applicability as well as a useful norm that can serve as a
practical guideline for director activities.
II.  The Conundrum: Recent Korean Corporate Governance Laws
A. The Catalyst
As many commentators have noted, the watershed event for Korea’s recent drive
for corporate reform was the Asian financial crisis, which overtook the Korean
economy in the late 1997.1) Just as external shocks often provide the much-needed
critical impetus to institutional reform, this crisis--commonly known as the IMF
crisis for the role the International Monetary Fund played in imposing
macroeconomic and structural adjustments on the Korean economy--was
particularly noteworthy for its humbling effect on the proud nation long accustomed
to double-digit annual growths and being touted as one of the most spectacular
economic success stories of the postwar era.
Self-doubt crept into the national psyche, and with the ensuing contagion of
corporate failures and the swift speed with which it was spreading, the public
demanded to know what was going on and began to ask serious questions about the
fundamental soundness of the way in which corporate management was being handled
at Korea’s leading companies. 
It was not that similar questions had not been raised before.  Amid academic circles
and left-wing political movements, there had been long and intense debates about the
chaebol question, as Korea’s family-owned leading businesses that operate in the form
of conglomerates are known.2) However, such debates tended to center around the
1) See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., “Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millenium”, 26 J. CORP. L. 546, 553-
555 (2001); Joongi Kim, “Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and Their Effects on International
Competition”, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 273-277 (2000); Hwa-Jin Kim, “Living with the IMF: A New
Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea”, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 61, 68-
81 (1999). 
2) See Hwa-Jin Kim, supra note 1, at 63-65. 
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distributive effects related to wealth concentration in the hands of the few, not
necessarily on the transparency and efficiency of corporate governance per se. Yet,
such bent had its own justifications in the sense that, after all, it is difficult to argue
with success. Most of the Korean chaebols began from a humble origin, one of the
most notable being the Daewoo Group, which was started by a recent college graduate
taking over a sweat shop with a handful of sewing machines but in the short span of
two decades transformed itself into the nation’s third largest business and a major
exporter of ships and automobiles, among others. To most Koreans, therefore, the
chaebols were the engines of growth, if at worst a necessary evil. But when groups
such as Daewoo went bust as a result of the IMF crisis, people began to demand not
only explanations, but also radical reform.
Adding fuel to the shock was the outrage factor induced by a number of corporate
bribery scandals. One of the most damning was the Hanbo scandal, which involved the
son of Korea’s then president as the master engineer of hundreds of million dollars
worth of political slush funds built upon crates of cash delivered under the table from
the country’s leading businessmen, including Hanbo’s chairman.3) That scandal
brought to light a dark pattern of doing business in Korea, which would be confirmed
scandal after scandal. That is, the company’s top management would bribe public
officials who wielded control over the largely government-owned banks so as to gain
favorable loans, the public officials would funnel part of that money to politicians
(who control their jobs) for the latter’s election chests, and if the loans later turned
problematic, more loans would be simply granted in what was essentially a taxpayer-
funded bailout. But in the case of Hanbo, due to the balance-of-payment deficit
induced by the currency crisis, bank cash reserves had simply dried up to keep the
troubled company afloat.
The public, for obvious reasons, was not happy with the misuse of the corporate
funds. There were ample media stories about such funds being used to support the
apparently lavish lifestyles of the chaebol families, to speculate on non-business-
related real estate or to finance an irresponsible “octopus-like” acquisition binge. That
the corporate scandals came in the midst of a national campaign to fight the currency
crisis by collecting gold from individuals did not help. Members of the public, some of
3) See Joongang Monthly, January 1, 1998, at 56.  
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whom went so far as to donate wedding rings for the national campaign, were
justifiably incensed and demanded accountability for such egregious mismanagement.
This time, the manager-owner heads of the chaebols were the villains, no longer the
mythologized heroes in the lore of Korean industrialization. The foregoing mark the
psychological backbone of the corporate reform measures introduced in response to
the IMF crisis.
But for the persistent and increasingly pervasive influence of foreign institutions,
however, even the aforementioned scandals might have ended up as one-time
happenings, as was often the case in the past, with a head roll and jail time for the few
who were unfortunate enough to get caught. The foreigners, however, were a different
breed, accustomed to a different set of norms and expectations. They also had
significant bargaining power. The foreign lenders and credit rating agencies, which
held the lifeline to Korea’s much needed foreign reserves, were demanding more
transparent accounting practices, including consolidated financial statements, more
periodic reporting and stricter restrictions on inter-affiliate fund transfers and
guarantees. In addition, the foreign institutional equity investors, which had acquired
substantial equity holdings in Korean companies on the cheap thanks to the crisis and
were practically moving the Korean bourse but wary of protecting their investments in
the highly volatile market, were also equally adamant in demanding an institutional
means to monitor the management and hold it accountable.  
Strapped for foreign capital, eager to restore international investor confidence and,
most importantly, desperate to appease the enraged voters at home, the Korean
legislature acted quickly to enact a number of measures in a demonstration of its
seriousness about corporate reform. But as we shall see, while laudable in intent, such
measures had an uneven and limited focus, leading to a flood of derivative suits in
which the directors, despite the best of their intentions, become too easy a target, often
at enormous and unjustifiable personal costs.
4) See, e.g., Black, supra note 1. 
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B. The Legislative Response
The litany of Korean corporate reform measures enacted following the IMF crisis
is well summarized elsewhere4), and does not require a repeat in entirety. This article
will discuss only those measures that relate directly to corporate governance, especially
the rights of shareholders relative to the directors.5) Such measures include:
• For all companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange, at least one-
fourth of the members of the board of directors were required to be
independent, outside directors.  This percentage was raised to at least
one-half for the largest listed companies (with assets KRW 2 trillion or
more).6)
• The minimum shareholding level required to assert shareholder rights
was reduced for (i) demanding removal of directors and auditors for
malfeasance, statutory or charter violations, or gross negligence in the
performance of duties,7) (ii) seeking an injunctive relief against a
director who violates the statute or charter,8) (iii) initiating a derivative
lawsuit, (iv) convening a general shareholder meeting,9) (v) inspecting
the company’s books and records,10) (vi) petitioning the courts to
appoint and inspect the company’s actions11) and (vii) demanding the
removal of a liquidator.12) 
• Shareholders may propose matters for consideration at a general
shareholder meeting.13)
5) Other sets of measures which may have equally important, if not greater, practical consequences relate to
accounting standards, reporting requirements, takeover restrictions, board and shareholder meeting procedures, audit
and nomination committees and statutory auditors. See Black, supra note 1, at 554-557. 
6) See Republic of Korea, Securities and Exchange Act, art. 191(16) and the Presidential Decree thereunder,
Article 84-23(1).
7) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, arts. 385(2) and 415.
8) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 402.
9) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 403.
10) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 366.
11) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 467.
12) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 539(2). 
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• Shareholders may demand cumulative voting in the election of
directors, unless otherwise provided in the company’s charter.14)
• Shareholders may vote in writing at a general shareholder meeting
without attending the meeting in person or by proxy.15)
•A fiduciary duty was explicitly added, requiring directors to “perform
their duties diligently in the interest of the company in accordance with
the statutes and the company’s charter.”16)
•Unofficial control persons who instruct directors on the conduct of the
company’s business or conduct such business in the name of a director
or using a senior executive title are subject to the same duties and
liabilities as directors.17)
• The meeting of the board of directors may be conducted by video
conferencing.18)
Thus for the most part, the foregoing measures have had the effect of strengthening
shareholder rights while adding burdens for the directors. To the extent that Korean
shareholders now have what would be considered as basic shareholder rights in the
U.S. corporations, it is certainly a commendable development. But now that the
lowered standing requirement has opened the floodgate of derivative suits, where does
that leave the directors? Given the large room of ambiguity of the current Korean law
on director duties and liabilities and the ways in which such ambiguity has been
manipulated in the past against the corporate directors to a punitive effect, one is left
wondering why commensurate protections for the directors have not been introduced.  
One thing is clear, though. While derivative suits seeking director liability have
multiplied in recent years thanks to the foregoing so-called reforms, directors stand
more vulnerable than ever to frivolous claims of misconduct since the current system
of Korean corporate law has no explicit mechanism for distinguishing the good
13) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 363-2.
14) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 382-2.
15) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 368-3.
16) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 382-3. 
17) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 401-2.
18) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 391(2). 
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derivative suits from the bad, that is, claims alleging illegal, malevolent, abusive or
grossly negligent managerial misconduct from those based on a mere error in business
judgment of the kind that happens in a corporate boardroom anywhere in the world. 
C. Spillovers from the Pandora’s Box: The Reform’s Unintended Consequences
Due to a strict shareholding requirement to qualify for standing,19) derivative
lawsuits were virtually non-existent prior to the IMF crisis. However, since the easing
of such requirement pursuant to the amendments to the Korean Commercial Code in
1998, there have been 20 such suits, involving as defendants some of the most high-
profile companies in Korea, such as Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Semiconductors,
Daewoo Group and Korea First Bank (KFB).20)
Some of the cases imposed staggering sums of monetary damages on the defendant
directors found to have breached their fiduciary duties. The KEB case, decided by the
Korean Supreme Court in March 2000, found four directors jointly and severally liable
for KRW 40 billion, even though the average total personal assets of such directors
would amount to less than, at most, one-tenth of such amount.21) In addition, the
Samsung case, decided in December 2001 and currently pending on appeal, imposed a
joint and several liability of KRW 90 billion on 11 directors.22)
As discussed below, given that the Samsung case involved facts that amount to no
more than ordinary negligence and questionable lines of reasoning by the court, the
result seems quite outrageous, at least from the point of the Samsung directors under
whose guardianship the company has become a leading international brand with record
levels of profits for years following the decision. 
Apart from the issue of whether the facts of the foregoing cases justify such
astronomical damage amounts, the mere possibility of unlimited personal liability
19) The pre-amendment requirement was the plaintiff shareholder or shareholders own a minimum of 5% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation to have standing in a derivative litigation. The amendment lowered the standing
requirement to 1% of the outstanding shares. 
20) http://www.peoplepower21.org/pec-suit.html.
21) See Supreme Court of Korea Decision No. 2000 Da 9086 dated March 15, 2000. The appellate process in
Korea is as follows: initial hearing at a District Court, appeal of the District Court ruling on legal and factual issues to
the High Court, and appeal of the High Court ruling on legal issues only to the Supreme Court. 
22) See Suwon District Court Decision No. 98 GaHap 22533 en banc dated December 27, 2001.
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bodes ill on the chances of recruiting the top talent into the ranks of directorship for
high-profile companies.  Furthermore, given that Korean laws and most of the Korean
corporate charters have yet to legislate any director indemnification statute and that the
director and officer (“D&O”) liability insurance is far from the norm among Korean
companies, the present status of derivative suits should work as an even more powerful
disincentive to joining the top management of a Korean firm. 
In fact, a byproduct of the recent spike in derivative litigation has been a boom for
the D&O liability insurance business. The business had only one insured case with a
total premium of KRW 2 million in 1996 but recorded 220 cases with a total premium
of KRW 37 billion in 1999, or an average of KRW 168 million per head, at an 84-fold
increase from merely three years ago.23) Based on these available numbers, it is
strongly questionable whether the average medium-to-small Korean company may
afford to pay the high premiums.  
Thus the irony. The judge deciding in the Samsung case might have wanted to set a
stern example for the rest of Korean companies by going after the best and biggest of
them. The symbolic lesson may have been well served, but the practical effect of his
decision has been to add a substantial cost factor to the average Korean company
already burdened with the notorious ‘scissor’ effect, i.e., shrinking market share and
profit margin from being squeezed from the labor-competitive countries like China and
the quality-competitive countries like Japan. 
The specter of derivative suits is likely to cause even more horror for the corporate
directors in light of Korea’s current and prospective social climate. One, given the
general anti-business sentiment following the (still ongoing) corporate bribery
scandals, any broad-stroke director indemnification statute is likely off the legislative
horizon. Two, the consumer(translated voter)-conscious Korean legislature is mulling
enactment of even more pro-plaintiff legislations such as eased class action
certification requirements in a step closer to turning the society into a litigation heaven. 
In concert with this trend, the number of annually admitted Korean attorneys has
risen to 1,000 by 2002 (from roughly 30 less than a decade ago), with less than 30%
of them expected to find paying jobs in government or at relatively large law firms.24)
It is anyone’s guess where the rest of them will end up, but it will be fair to forecast
23) See Donga Daily, Feb. 19, 2000. In general, the company pays for the D&O insurance premiums. 
24) See Kyunghyang Daily, January 7, 2002. 
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that a good number will turn to strike suits as members of the plaintiff’s bar,
especially when the potential monetary awards from director liability suits seem so
lucrative. At least until now, most of the derivative suits have been represented by
high-minded civic groups such as Chamyeo-yondae(in English, the People’s
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), whose apparent primary motive at least
thus far has been to set high moral examples for the rest of society to follow. With
the arrival of the newly enlarged and financially driven plaintiff’s bar, however, any
company with a reasonably deep pocket will likely be a fair game. 
Furthermore, a bill introducing class actions modeled after American law is likely
to be enacted in 2004.25) The stated goal of such bill is to help force the chaebols to
improve accountability, transparency and ethical behavior.26)
All of the foregoing may be creatures spilling from the Pandora’s box opened up by
the IMF crisis. And in retrospect, many commentators point to the crisis as an accident
waiting to happen, a natural outcome for a society and economy that grew way too fast
without having had the opportunity to sort through its priorities and resolve the many
conflicts that arose in connection therewith.
Whatever the cause, however, a few things are clear. Under the founding principles
of a corporation, the corporation is managed ultimately by its directors. In order for the
directors to do their job properly, they need to act with broad discretion, or at least with
the freedom from fear that their every move may be scrutinized and later punished in
the court of law with potentially limitless personal liability. However, the present
corporate governance law of Korea does not provide such protection. It did not do so
before the crisis, and the crisis only made things worse, creating all the more reason for
the adoption of the likes of the business judgment rule.
III.  The Business Judgment Rule 
A. The Rule 
A concept dating as far as 1742 in England and 1829 in the United States, the
25) Korea Economic News Daily, September 26, 2003.
26) See id. 
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business judgment rule in its simplest form stands for the judicial reluctance to second-
guess decisions by directors regarding the conduct of business.27)
Such judicial self-restraint takes the form of a presumption that business decisions
are made by disinterested and independent directors on an informed basis and with a
good faith belief that the decision will serve the best interests of the corporation.28) If
directors are sued with respect to a business decision they have made in the course of
performing their duties, the court will examine the decision only to the extent
necessary to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged and proven facts that
overcome the foregoing presumption.29)
If the presumption is not overcome, the business judgment rule dictates the court to
stop the suit at that point and not go further to examine the substantive merits of the
underlying business decision.30) If the presumption, however, is overcome, the court
will evaluate the entire fairness of the transaction, including as to whether there was a
fair dealing and a fair price.31)
B. The Rationale
The business judgment rule is considered to be a standard of judicial review as
opposed to a standard of conduct.32) In other words, the standard by which the directors
will actually be held liable in the court of law is set at a much higher level than the
“aspirational” code of conduct established under the fiduciary duties.33) To elaborate,
the directors are deemed to have duties of care and loyalty as fiduciaries to the
corporation. Under the duty of care, the directors are obligated to exercise the care that
a person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; in the director’s
context, such duty includes the duty to monitor, inquire and otherwise be informed
27) See Dennis J. Block et al., The Business Judgement Rule 9 (1998)
28) See id. at 5.
29) See id.
30) See id. 
31) See id. at 28.
32) See Melvin A. Eisenberg, “The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate
Law”, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437
33) See id. at 463. 
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about the nature of his duties.34) Under the duty of loyalty, the directors are obligated to
avoid self-dealing, domination or other conflicts of interests situations that would
interrupt the independent and objective decision-making by the director. 35) Such
obligations notwithstanding and absent loyalty issues, under the standard of liability
imposed under the business judgment rule the directors will not be penalized unless
they have committed a bad-faith or grossly negligent breach of the duty of care.36) In a
normal tort action, the alleged tortfeasor would have been subjected to a much liberal
standard of ordinary negligence with respect to his carelessness. 
Why the divergence? As Melvin Eisenberg notes, the dichotomy is based on the
court’s recognition of the peculiar nature of a business judgment.37) Business judgments
inherently involve risk-taking despite imperfect information.38) But if shareholders with
the perfect hindsight are allowed to bring an after-the-fact litigation to punish the
directors for mere errors in judgment, the directors will lose the incentive to act quickly
and decisively for fear of personal liability. Such result would directly undermine the
very purpose of corporate management, and it will especially be the case for directors
of a modern corporation, beset with a flood of information and limitless competition
that combine to require instant decision-making for corporate survival.  
Some may raise the point that after-the-fact judgments are what a court does, and
citing malpractice suits against lawyers or doctors, may argue that corporate directors
should be no exception. However, in legal or medical malpractice suits, objective
standards such as law or science are available in order to evaluate the merit of the
defendant’s judgment; no similar counterpart is available for business decisions.39)
Suppose, as in a classic example provided by the American Law Institute, that
directors of Acme, Inc. are faced with a decision whether to invest in an expensive
technology to develop a new product. Further suppose that they decide not to invest
due to cost considerations, but a competitor does so invest and develops a highly
34) See Block, supra note 27, at 117-132. 
35) See id. at 261-265.
36) See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6
(Del. 1984). 
37) See Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 464.
38) See id. at 444.
39) See id.
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successful new product that takes away Acme’s market share to the point Acme is
compelled to declare bankruptcy. Should the directors of Acme be held liable for their
misjudgment? What if they decided to invest despite the cost, but ended up with a
poorly received product, and Acme goes bankrupt because of it? The answer is no in
both cases if either decision was made in good faith and after reasonable deliberation.40)
The business judgment rule, however, does not stand for the proposition of a no-
liability regime for director actions. It merely suggests that judicial review be limited to
the procedural elements of the director’s decision-making ex ante, such as reasonable
informedness, rather than the substantive merit of their decisions that can be evaluated
only post facto.  
This concern for fairness marks the primary defense of the business judgment rule.
The rule also has other rationales. One, the rule ensures that the directors, not the
shareholders, are in charge of managing corporate affairs, as is intended under the
basic theory of a corporation.41) That is, when investors sign up to become shareholders
by investing in equity rather than debt, they are in essence foregoing a stable stream of
income for a riskier, but potentially higher rate of return.42) This means that, as
fiduciaries to the corporation and by extension to its shareholding owners, directors
have an obligation to seek a high rate of return for the shareholders, and in order to do
so, should be given broad discretion to take necessary risks. Furthermore, shareholders
have traded in the decision-making authority in exchange for the safety of limited
liability.43) However, if shareholders are allowed to demand frequent judicial reviews of
director decisions in the absence of the business judgment rule, the shareholders are
essentially taking away such authority to the point of becoming the de facto corporate
managers, despite the implied deal not to for reasons of limited liability.44) This means
that the directors, having neither the discretion nor the incentive to do their job right
and furthermore stuck with potentially boundless personal liability, will have no choice
but to be risk-averse. But such an outcome would precisely be against the
40) See American Law Institute, 1 Principles of Corp. Governance 4.01(c) cmt. f, illus. 1 (1992)
41) See Block, supra note 27, at 17. See also William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporation§1037 (2003).  
42) See Fletcher, supra note 41, §1037.
43) See id. 
44) See id. 
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shareholders’ self-interest because if a passive investment management is what they
wanted, they should have bought debt instead. Thus, the business judgment rule
protects not just the directors, but ultimately the shareholder interests as well. 
Two, there are other means to check director behavior and protect shareholder
interests. For one, shareholders of publicly traded corporations can simply exit by
selling their shares on the market.45) As for shareholders of a closed corporation to
whom such option is often unavailable, they can at least vote the directors out of their
jobs.46) Further, if directors do a bad enough job, the chance increases that their
corporation will be an acquisition target, in which event they will more likely than not
find themselves out of a job.47) In addition, directors may also be given stock options so
that their interests will align with the shareholders.48) In short, thanks to the availability
of the foregoing market-based mechanisms, the business judgment rule will not create
a moral hazard under which directors take reckless actions unmindful of the
consequences of their actions.
Third, the business judgment promotes an efficient use of the court’s resources.49)
Without the rule, the shareholders (or more precisely the plaintiff’s bar) will have a
greater incentive to flood the court with derivative suits, and the court is already
operating under the constraints of scarce resources.50) Furthermore, the judge is not an
expert on corporate management. But if the court is used as a forum to assess the merit
of every minor business judgment, it will soon convert into a “super-boardroom”
funded by taxpayer’s money, a role the court should hardly be playing and in any event
would not be doing a good job at. 
C. The Mechanics
As for specific applications, the business judgment works in two ways. One is the
allocation of the burden of proof as noted above. First, the plaintiff has the burden of
45) See id; see also Peter V. Letsou, “Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and
Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule”, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179 (2001). 
46) See Fletcher, supra note 41, §1037.
47) See id.
48) See id. 
49) See Block, supra note 27, at 15.
50) See id. 
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proof that would be sufficient to overcome the presumption, and once the presumption
is overcome, the defendant has to prove the entire fairness of the transaction.51) Such
allocation appears to be designed to maintain procedural equity by dividing the
evidentiary burden evenly between the parties while attempting to avoid frivolous
lawsuits by imposing the burden first on the plaintiff. In practical terms, however, since
the plaintiff always bears the initial burden of proof, the real teeth of the business
judgment rule can be said to lie in the gradated substantive standards of liability
tailored to the fiduciary duty at issue or to the stage of litigation. 
To elaborate, the plaintiff shareholder initially has to prove a breach of the
defendant director’s fiduciary duty, either with respect to the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty, to a level the court will be persuaded to impose liability. Proving a breach of
the duty of loyalty offers no special hurdle since the relevant standard here is the
preponderance of evidence, the ordinary evidentiary threshold used in any civil
litigation. However, proving a breach of the duty of care presents quite a difficult
challenge since gross negligence, rather than the ordinary negligence required under
ordinary tort actions, has to be found. 
Why the dichotomy? While the duties of loyalty and care both have roots in the
traditional duties of a trustee charged with guarding other people’s money (often
involving the life savings of orphans and widows), the American courts seem to
acknowledge the fact that in modern corporations the fiduciary should be given a
broader discretion in making business judgments and therefore have loosened the
traditional duty of prudent investment. 
At any rate, once the plaintiff proves a breach of either fiduciary duty, the defendant
has to prove the entire fairness. Entire fairness is an exacting standard that requires
proving facts to the court’s satisfaction, rather than on the basis of an objective
guideline (other than the case-specific and therefore inherently vague ‘fair dealing’ and
‘fair price’ standards).52) Thus, while not necessarily true in all cases, the type of
judicial standard of review (preponderance, gross negligence or fairness) applicable
has often been known to be “outcome-determinative.”53)
51) See id. at 19.
52) See Block, supra note 27, at 30.
53) See id. at 33. 
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D. Analysis
The business judgment rule is not without its critics. For one, attacks have been
levied on the Delaware Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of law to facts with
respect to the gross negligence standard in the duty of care context. For instance, the
court in the representative case of Smith v. Van Gorkom54) has been widely criticized
for finding gross negligence on facts closer to being ordinary negligence in light of the
prevailing corporate practices then.55) However, in the more recent case of Brehm v.
Eisner 56), the court apparently returned to the traditional view of the business judgment
rule by grounding the gross negligence standard in the notion of rationality-rather than
reasonableness and reaffirming that gross negligence should not be found where the
defendant directors have acted with a “rational business purpose” unless their actions
amounted to a breach of the substantive duty of care, or “waste”, equivalent to a gift of
corporate assets or a transfer thereof for an egregiously low consideration.  
Another criticism of the rule has focused on the ambiguity surrounding the scope of
judicial review in the context of entire fairness, arising due to a lack of objective
standards to determine how that burden may be met. 
It is noteworthy that the criticisms are levied mostly at the rule’s applications, but
seldom at its policy rationales. Even with respect to the applications, the business
judgment rule offers a far clearer set of guideline to establish the norms of expected
director behavior than the current Korean law does. For instance, even under the
worst-case situation of Van Gorkom, all the directors have to do in the context of a sale
of their company are: retain outside experts, review the transaction documents and take
the time to ask questions on the background and pricing of the deal. 
Likewise, in determining the advisability of incorporating the business judgment
rule into the Korean context, it is difficult to anticipate an opposition to it on a policy
basis. Like its American counterpart, Korean economy too is a market economy that
awards high risks with high rewards. Directors of Korean companies too are the
designated top managers of their respective corporations and they too try to maximize
the rate of return for the shareholders despite having to work with inherently imperfect
54) 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
55) See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 448. 
56) 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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information. Few in number and unassisted by law clerks, Korean judges too are
overworked and are by no experts in making business decisions.
But as stated before, the tough question concerning the business judgment rule is
not why, but how and where. In the spirit thereof, the next sections will review the
current regime of Korean laws governing director duties and liabilities and explore the
ways in which judicial activism may be used to re-interpret the statutes to incorporate
the key elements of the business judgment rule. 
IV.  The Quagmire: A Review of the Current 
Korean Statutory Framework 
A. Introduction
Can the business judgment rule make it into Korean law? The short answer is: yes,
but difficult. This is because the Korean law, as it stands, poses resistance at a number
of levels: systemic, doctrinal and textual. 
The most obvious is at the systemic level. The Korean legal system is based on
civil law traditions, having borrowed from Japan and Germany. One central feature of
the continental system is the supremacy of the codified statute, to the exclusion of the
judicially developed common law. On the positive side, such a system allows for, at
least in theory, a uniform application of the law by eliminating the chance that
contradictory rulings among different judges can each turn into authoritative law. But
on the negative side, where the statutory language is ambiguous or inconsistent, the
system has no ready mechanism to clarify the law where it is elusive. Such problem
becomes even more severe in cases like Korea, where statutory definitions or
legislative intents are seldom spelled out or published. 
Under the civil law systems, the role of the judge is also precarious. On the one
hand, they are not bound by precedents, even those coming from higher courts, and
therefore are afforded wide discretion in performing their job, whose primary feature is
to decide whether a given set of facts amounts to a statutory violation. On the other
hand, precisely because their decisions are not binding, there is little incentive for the
judge to expound on legal arguments or incorporate new doctrines. In fact, the legal
reasoning in most Korean cases amounts to little more than verbatim recitations of the
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statutory language.  
Hence, a structural problem stands before the future of the business judgment rule
in Korea. That is, the judges do not have the incentive to carefully lay the logical
building blocks for the rule, and even if some of them wanted to, they may be ignored
by the rest. However, all is not lost. If carefully reasoned and backed by sound policy, a
precedent can still serve as a persuasive authority, which will be particularly true if
coming from the Korean Supreme Court, whose justices have a great say on the
personnel decisions for all judges in Korea. Furthermore, powerful ideas go a long
distance, even on their own. The judges do not have to explicitly state so, but may still
incorporate good ideas into their final decisions. Thus, the inherent structural bias
notwithstanding, the business judgment rule still has a fighting chance to work its way
into Korean jurisprudence.
More problematic are the doctrinal challenges interlaced into Korean laws
governing director duties and liabilities. More aptly put, the problem is the lack of
specialized doctrines tailored for the specific context of corporate directors. Hence, the
directors become subject to the same evidentiary and liability rules that apply in any
tort action. While such rules may promote equity in the general setting, they do a
terrible job in the director liability context, particularly given the real of threat of
frivolous derivative lawsuits. And since such rules for the most part are explicitly
integrated into current Korean statutes, on practical terms they represent the tightest
constraints on the incorporation of the business judgment rule.
Another problem has to do with the textual ambiguity of much of the Korean law
governing director liability. While such ambiguity may serve as a flexible cover for
incorporating the specifics of the business judgment doctrine, it also works as a
slippery anchor when trying to firmly dock the doctrine. 
The foregoing sketches some of the major problems with the current director
liability regime in Korea. But as noted before, there are solutions, i.e., by way of
principled and innovative judicial interpretations of the statute. But to appreciate the
solution, one must first understand the problem. In spirit thereof, we turn to a review of
the relevant Korean laws governing corporate directors and some of their major
shortcomings. 
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B. The Basic Legal Framework
1. Powers of Directors
Under the Commercial Code, the directors of a Korean corporation have expansive
powers. While the powers of shareholders are limited to those specified in the
corporate charter, which usually does not amount to much, the Commercial Code
reserves the following matters exclusively for the board decision: disposition and
transfer of major corporate assets, borrowing a substantial sum of money, the hiring
and firing of senior management, and the opening and closing of branch offices.57) The
shareholders, however, retain the authority to elect and remove directors at a general
meeting of shareholders.
One apparently peculiar attribute of the Korean directors is their statutorily explicit
authority to monitor each other. It is the power and duty of the board as a whole to
supervise individual directors58), a director may compel at any time that information on
how other directors are performing their duties be reported to the board,59) and each
director in fact has to make a quarterly report to the board on his job performance.60)
But such provisions can be understood in light of the fact that they target primarily
the representative director. The representative director is a dominant figure in a Korean
corporation, often being its founder and largest shareholder. He also has the statutory
authority to represent and bind the company in its external relations, and in practice is
responsible for making all the day-to-day executive decisions, not unlike the director in
a U.S. corporation who doubles up as the chief executive officer and board
chairperson. Given his influential role, it makes sense that the representative director
be subjected to substantial scrutiny by the board 61), although it may be a case of poor
57) In addition, the directors are deemed to have certain exclusive authorities not subject to shareholder approval.
They include the rights to approve restrictions on the transfer of shares, convene the general meetings of shareholders,
approve a self-dealing by a director, approve financial statements, and issue corporate bonds. Chul-Song Lee, Treatise
on Corporate Law [hoisabeop-gangui] 538 (2003). 
58) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 393(2)
59) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 393(3)
60) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 393(4)
61) Under the statute, the board elects one of the directors as the representative director, although in practice the
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draftsmanship that the statute does not distinguish the representative director from all
the other directors in defining their respective duties and therefore the latter are
subjected to equal board scrutiny as well as equal duties and related liabilities as the
representative directors. 
A question can be raised as to whether such equal treatment is fair to the outside
directors who play a substantially limited role. It is a fair question, but touches upon a
phenomenon not uncommon. For example, in the United States, the inside and outside
directors face the same fiduciary duties and liabilities. A more poignant question
would be whether the system affords the outside directors due protections, such as in
the form of the business judgment rule, which would soften the potential unfairness.
Korea does not, and that adds all the more reason for it to adopt the likes of such rule. 
2. Directors’ Duties
Benchmarked against the U.S. fiduciary duties of care and loyalty applicable to
corporate directors, the Korean duty of loyalty is relatively robust.  Under the
Commercial Code, the directors may not compete with the corporation by taking
corporate opportunities or by serving as a director or senior officer in another
corporation engaged in the same line of business 62) or engage in self-dealing.63) The
directors also must keep confidential the company’ trade secrets 64), monitor other
directors in their performance of duties,65) report to the board on a quarterly basis,66) and
report immediately to the statutory auditor or audit committee any matter that may
cause serious harm to the corporation.67)
A problem of underdevelopment, however, plagues the duty of care component. It is
not that the Korean statute does not provide for one. In fact, it provides two. First, under
Article 382 of the Commercial Code, which defines the director’s relationship to the
representative director is elected by the board from its members.
62) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 397.
63) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 398. 
64) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 382.4.
65) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 393(2)
66) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 393(4).
67) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 412.2
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corporation as that of a trustee fiduciary and imputes to the director the duties applicable
to such fiduciary under the Civil Code, the director has a duty to “carry out the business
entrusted to him with the care of a good custodian and in accordance with the original
intent of such entrustment.” 68) In addition, under Article 382-3 of the Commercial Code,
which was added in 1998, the director has a duty to “perform his duties diligently in the
interest of the corporation and in accordance with laws and the corporate charter.”  
These are fine words, but either provision is devoid of any substance. Part of the
problem is systemic in that, as discussed previously, Korean statutes are seldom
accompanied by published legislative intent or formal definitions. And thus far,
partially due to the relatively recentness of director liability litigations, the Korean
courts have provided little meaningful guidance on how to apply said provisions.
First of all, to dissect the meaning of the Article 382 duty of care (incorporating the
language from Article 681 of the Civil Code), it is unclear what would be the “original
intent” of the entrustment applicable to corporate directors, other than perhaps, as may
be inferred from Article 382.3, to act in the interest of the corporation in accordance
with applicable laws and the corporate charter.  The nature and amount of “care” that is
required is also unspecified.   
Furthermore, the function of the Article 382-3 duty of diligence is also unclear.
Some commentators argue that such duty was intended as the duty of loyalty found in
Anglo-American jurisprudence, by noting that the Korean term for diligence,
choongsil, may on a stretch be interpreted as meaning loyalty.69) However, given that
the duty of loyalty component has been robustly expressed in Korean statutes as noted
above, it is questionable whether the duty of diligence adds any substance. The
majority view among Korea’s legal scholars is therefore that the duty of diligence
serves to merely emphasize for the director the importance of exercising care and
diligence in the performance of their duties.70) 
A mystery remains, though, as to the nature of the care and diligence required
under the Commercial Code. Further, one is left wondering whether, based on a strict
reading of both provisions, acting within the scope of authority specified under the
laws and the corporate charter and in the interest of the corporation should not satisfy
68) See Republic of Korea, Civil Code, art. 681.
69) See Hyung-Rak Jung, Treatise on the Commercial Code[sangbeop gangui]  831-834 (2001).
70) See id. 
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the statutory duties of care and negligence.
To be fair, the lack of substance in the duty of care element is not a problem
endemic to Korea only. Even the Delaware courts, probably the most experienced and
influential source of American corporate law, did not specify substance for the duty of
care until 1963,71) and the debate is still brewing as to its proper content.72) However,
Delaware at least offers the minimum guideline of informedness, which can be used as
a practical standard of conduct by corporate directors in most situations involving
active decision-making.73) Korea does not. Furthermore, as we shall see shortly, since
the Korean liability regime is skewed heavily against the directors, they are indeed
squeezed into a place between a rock and a hard place, lacking guidance on how to act
and easily punished for honest errors made while acting in the dark as well as for good
decisions that turn out badly due to no fault of their own.  
3. Director Liability
Under the Commercial Code, the directors may be held jointly and severally liable
for harm suffered by the corporation74) or by third parties.75) Such liability applies
equally to the representative director and any “unofficial control person” who
indirectly controls a director.76) Liability is imposed personally on the directors at fault,
and in the event the action in question was taken pursuant to a board resolution, on
those directors who voted for the resolution 77) or whose names are not recorded in the
corporate minutes as having voted against to the resolution.78)
In a derivative action a director may avoid liability to the corporation if the
shareholders unanimously approved his action.79) No such exemption is available in
third party actions. As for remedies, while monetary damage is available in both types
71) See Lyman Johnson, “Rethinking the Business Judgment Rule”, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787, 794 (1999). 
72) See id. 
73) See id. at 805.
74) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 399(1). 
75) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 401(1). 
76) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 401-2
77) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 399(2)
78) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 399(3). 
79) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 400.
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of action, injunctive relief may be granted only in derivative actions and to the extent
that the corporation faces a threat of “irreversible harm.” 80)
For both derivative and third party actions, there are two avenues by which a
director liability action may be brought. One is through the Commercial Code, which
specifies separate causes of action for the derivative and third party suits. The other is
through the “illegality” claim under the Civil Code, which applies uniformly to both
types of suits but involves different elements, evidentiary rules and statutes of
limitation from those required under the Commercial Code. Unfortunately, however, as
discussed below, none of the foregoing causes of action is logically coherent or
conducive to a procedurally and substantively equitable outcome.
a) The Commercial Code Cause of Action
Under Article 399 of the Commercial Code, directors may be held jointly and
severally liable to the corporation for (i) a violation of the laws or the corporate charter,
or (ii) a dereliction of the directorial duties.81) While apparently short and simple, this
provision is home to many analytical and practical pitfalls.  
First, there is some debate over whether a violation of the laws or the corporate
charter constitutes a per se, or strict, liability.82) While the majority of commentators
agree that it does, the minority view is that the defendant director should not be held
liable if he could prove that such violation was not due to an intentional or negligent
misconduct of the director.83)
This dispute stems from the issue of whether the liability provisions of the
Commercial Code are subsumed in their entirety by the contractual breach provisions
of the Civil Code. As noted above, under Article 382(2) of the Commercial Code, a
director is deemed to have a contractual relationship to the corporation as its trustee,
and a breach of contract is governed by provisions of the Civil Code.84) One such
relevant Civil Code provision is Article 390, which states: “If the obligor does not
80) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 402.
81) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 399(1).
82) See Jung, supra note 69, at 846.
83) See id. 
84) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code, art. 382(2).
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perform in accordance with the terms of the contract, the obligee may sue for damages,
unless such non-performance is not due to an intentional or negligent misconduct of
the obligor.” 85) Thus, the argument goes that, if for instance a director violated a
statutory provision because of lack of knowledge of such provision, the violation was
neither intentional nor negligent (given that in Korea ignorance of the law does not
necessarily constitute negligence) and the director therefore should not be held liable.
But the issue remains unresolved in yet another illustration of the underdeveloped
nature of Korean statutes on director liability.
Furthermore, what to make of a ‘dereliction of duties’ is inherently unclear since
the scope of director duties remains largely undefined, particularly with respect to the
duty of care. And since it is undetermined how much care a director should exercise,
the same applies to determining when a breach of such duty occurs, similar to the
classic “chicken or egg” dilemma.
This problem is actually made worse in actual litigation due to the court’s unfiltered
importation into director liability suits of the Civil Code provisions on evidentiary rules
and the notion of foreseeability.
The default rules of evidence governing Korean civil litigations are based on the
Learned Hand notion that between the plaintiff and the defendant, whoever has the
lesser burden of proof, as measured by informational access or proximity to the source,
is made to bear the evidentiary burden. Furthermore, under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the defendant obligor (in our case, the director) has the burden of proving the
absence of an intentional or negligent act on his part in connection with the alleged
breach.86) Combined, what this means is that the defendant director has the burden of
establishing not only what his duties are, but also that he did not breach such duties and
further that there was no fault on his part with respect to a possibly non-existent duty
that he probably did not commit.  
This outcome would have been comedic but for the unfairness to the director.
Ironically, however, such rule is justified under a notion of equity that the court, as an
active guardian of the “weak”, should correct for any informational asymmetry
between litigants. The rule may make sense as a general principle of law; however, in
the context of director liability suits where the rules of the game are virtually non-
85) See Republic of Korea, Civil Code, art. 390.
86) See Republic of Korea, Civil Code, art. 390.
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existent, the evidentiary rule unduly has an outcome-determinative effect by placing an
exorbitantly heavy burden of proof on the defendant director.  
The foreseeability issue is an even greater hurdle. Under Article 393 of the Civil
Code, damages arising from a breach of contract are limited to the “ordinary and
normal” limits, provided that in the case of damages “caused by special
circumstances” the obligor shall be liable only if he “knew or could have known” of
such circumstances.87) Again, the evidentiary rule operates so that the defendant
director has to establish not only the existence of the intervening special circumstance,
but also that he lacked actual or imputed knowledge thereof.  
The foreseeability provision is problematic on several points. First of all, it is
unclear whether the provision adds any practical value. This is because the notion of
negligence already incorporates the concept of foreseeability under Korean law, and
therefore if negligence is established in the course of litigation as a matter of law and
fact, there is no role for foreseeability to play in assessing the amount of damages. The
provision also has little applicability as to an intentional act since such notion involves
a belief that a result was substantially certain to occur.
The foreseeability provision is also unduly unfair to the defendant director. One,
there is no reasonableness qualifier. Therefore, the director can be on the hook for
failing to anticipate even the most remotely possible contingency. Two, the notion of
foreseeability by necessity drags judicial scrutiny into the consequences of the
director’s decision, or its substantive merit. Thus, his ex ante cover is blown by any
post facto slip no matter how reasonable a director’s precautionary measures may be in
the eyes of equity. 
The latter point contradicts the principal underpinning of the business judgment
rule, which is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess the substantive merit
of the director’s business decision, as measured by its consequences.
In fact, as will be discussed below in greater detail, there have been some efforts by
the Korean court to adopt the main thrust of the business judgment rule by dictating
that a review of whether a director has met his fiduciary duties of care and diligence be
“process-oriented” rather than “result-based.” Such stance would have worked if
Article 399 on director liability were the only concern. However, by operation of
Article 393, which requires a review of the consequences of the director’s decision for
87) See Republic of Korea, Civil Code, art. 393.
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the purpose of foreseeability analysis, the judicial approach does not quite reach its
intended effect.
The Korean statutes do provide for certain saving graces. However, in each case,
they leave much to be desired. One saving mechanism concerns the shareholder
ratification of director actions, as mentioned above. However, since such ratification
requires a unanimous approval, including that of the suing shareholder, the provision
has little practical value.  
Another comes in the form of mitigated damages under Article 765 of the Civil
Code, which provides that (i) if damages from a contractual breach are not caused by
an intentional or grossly negligent act, and further if the payment of such damages
would create a substantial hardship on the defendant in terms of maintaining his
livelihood, the defendant may petition the court to reduce the amount of such damages,
and (ii) the court may so reduce based on considerations of the relative economic
conditions of the litigants as well as the cause of such damages.88)
Article 765 is certainly better than nothing. However, it comes too little too late in
the game. In a society like Korea where face counts much, substantial damage in the
form of an irreversible stigma is already done to the defendant director at the point that
he is found to have negligently or intentionally abandoned his fiduciary duties. The
problem is especially severe given that outside directorship is often doled out as an
honorary position.  Furthermore, a finding of liability under the Civil Code also takes a
real bite in the sense that it can be used for any criminal proceedings against the director
and under Articles 191-16(3), 54-5(4) and 191-12(3) of the Korean Securities Exchange
Code, a person convicted of criminal acts punishable by imprisonment may be barred
from serving as an outside director of a publicly traded company for two years.
b) The “Illegality” Cause of Action
Under Article 750 of the Civil Code, a person who harms another person in the
course of an “illegal” act involving an intentional or negligent conduct is liable for the
resulting damages.89) Article 750 establishes a conceptual framework that is nearly
equivalent to a tort action in Korea. The scope of an “illegal” act here is all
88) See Republic of Korea, Civil Code, art. 765.
89) See Republic of Korea, Civil Code, art. 750.
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encompassing. It includes not only a statutory or regulatory violation, but also an
immoral or unethical act that is against Korea’ “public policy.” Essentially, the scope
of its application is as pleases the presiding judge.
Technically, therefore, under the Article 750 illegality claim a double jeopardy
situation may befall a director who has successfully defended himself in a liability
action brought under the Commercial Code causes of action. In practice, however,
such situation seldom happens if a motion for joinder is filed with the court,
although there is no precedent that would require the granting of the joinder motion
in such cases.
The illegality claim does provide certain practical advantages to the plaintiff.  First,
the statute of limitations for an illegality claim may run longer than that of a
Commercial Code cause of action in that the former allows the statute to run until the
later of 10 years from the occurrence of an illegal act or three years following the
discovery thereof 90) whereas the latter cuts off the running at 10 years following the act
in question.91) Second, the illegality claim allows for restitution as an elective remedy
in the case of corporate defamation although it is not clear precisely what actions the
defendant must take in order to restore the good name of the corporation. 
One offsetting feature of an illegality suit is that the burden of proof, at least as a
default rule, lies entirely with the plaintiff. However, as has been seen before, such
advantage may not mean much in practice given that there is no legal bar to prevent
the judge from exercising his discretion to shift such burden to the defendant if the
defendant has relatively better access to information than the plaintiff.
In short, the illegality cause of action under Article 750 unnecessarily places an
additional layer of burden on the defendant director.
4. Liabilities to Third Parties
Under Section 401 of the Commercial Code, a director, together with other
directors and the corporation, may be held jointly and severally liable to third parties
for harm caused by the negligent performance of his duties if such misfeasance rises to
the level of gross negligence or an intentional act.92) 
90) See Jung, supra note 69, at 854.
91) See Jung, supra note 69, at 851. 
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This provision is based on the policy rationale of preventing directors from “thinly
capitalizing” the company to the harm of outside parties who are at an informational
disadvantage with respect to the company’s financial status. However, as is the case
with a good portion of Korean corporate law, Section 401 is based on an antiquated
notion of equity. In other words, while the policy may have made sense in the pre-IMF
corporate Korea when the company’s founder coupling as the largest shareholder and
representative director practically ran a one-man show while it was virtually
impossible for a minority shareholder to bring a derivative suit due to strict standing
and other requirements and the lending banks who were acting largely under
government directives performed little financial due diligence, such policy no longer
carries the same merit in today’s world of outsider directors, shareholder activism and
international credit rating agencies.  
For one thing, the law is now aimed at the wrong target. If the corporate veil should
be pierced for reasons of deliberately thin capitalization or improper commingling of
assets, the beneficiaries, namely the owners of the corporation, should be on the hook,
not the directors who are merely working at their behest. Granted that there may be a
substantial overlap between the two, especially in the case of closely held companies.
But even so, there should be at minimum some kind of liability protection for the
outside directors of a public corporation who work for a fixed pay and own little equity
in the company.93)
Another possible justification for third party liability is that it will deter director
misbehavior in caving to unfairly biased equity-holder demands vis-a-vis the creditor.
However, directors are principally fiduciaries of the corporation and its shareholders,
not of outside parties. But by effectively imposing a competing fiduciary duty for the
benefit of outside parties, Section 401 creates an inherent conflict of interests for the
directors in contravention of the basic principles of corporate law.
Can Section 401 be justified by the fact other countries also have at least indirect
mechanisms for holding directors accountable for harm to a third party? For instance,
in the U.S., the corporation is directly liable to the third party, but it may seek
indemnification from the directors for such harm if it was due to bad faith or gross
negligence on the part of the director. However, the answer is still no since there is a
92) See Republic of Korea, Commercial Code art. 401.
93) See Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 445. 
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critical difference between the U.S. system and Korea’s Section 401. In the former, the
notion of gross negligence is firmly founded on the protection of the business
judgment rule. In Korea, the business judgment rule is still in its nascent form and does
not yet provide the court with useful guidance for weeding out the truly grossly
negligent or bad-faith decision-making process from a mere error in business judgment
that unfortunately results in much harm to the corporation or to third parties.
Therefore, in Korea it is possible for a director to be held liable for corporate debt even
if the director was merely doing his job as a director in approving such loans and did it
in the best interest of the corporation. In fact, that is precisely what the Korean Deposit
Insurance Corporation, which like its U.S. counterpart insures a certain amount of
bank customer deposits, is aiming to do on behalf of banks holding bad corporate debt.
In the U.S., however, such suits would be dismissed at the outset under the rubric of
the business judgment rule.
In this light, even the well-intentioned standard of gross negligence under Section
401 for third party claims (but not necessarily for derivative claims) may create
perverse consequences. This is because in anticipation of the unprincipled shootout
which is the current status of the director liability suits in Korea, directors will grapple
at any available line of defense, and one such defense useful in establishing the lack of
gross negligence is an act in compliance with common customs and usage. In other
words, the directors will have an incentive not to be more daring than their
counterparts in other corporations, contrary to the intent behind the Section 401 gross
negligence standard in encouraging an acceptable level of risk taking for corporate
directors.
Section 401 has another curious aspect in that it penalizes a “negligent
performance” of directors’ duties, but not a violation of the statute or corporate charter,
as is the case in the provision governing liability to the corporation. Does the omission
reflect the legislative intent to further reduce the scope of director liability in the case
of third party liability (in addition to the gross negligence standard)? If so, the policy
justification is unclear. For instance, the legislature could have gone the other way and
limited director liability to a statutory or charter violation, which would have made
more intuitive sense. At any rate, such omission represents yet another glaring hole in
Korea’s director liability jurisprudence and calls for judicial, if not legislative, repair. 
In sum, the defects of the Korean statutes on director duties and liabilities can be
summarized as a classic case of the blind leading the blind. First, there is no statutory
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guidance or safe harbor as to the level and scope of care and diligence the director
should exercise to avoid future litigation. Second, even if there were some guidance,
under the broad-based liability regime that spans both the Commercial Code and the
Civil Code, the director could be dragged into court on virtually any ground that may
be construed as illegal or negligent, barred only by the creativity of the plaintiff’s
lawyer and the mercy of the court. Third, once in litigation, the defendant directors
have no effective weapon to fend off the charge of negligence, since they have the
burden of proving that they did not fail in providing for every foreseeable contingency.
Fourth, there is no cap on the amount of damages, and each director is jointly and
severally held liable. 
Given this statutory backdrop on the director duties and liabilities, the role of the
judiciary becomes even more important in protecting the directors from frivolous suits.
The next section reviews the extent to which the rule has found its place in Korean
jurisprudence and highlights some ways for incorporating the rule more systematically. 
V.  Suggestions: A Case for Further Judicial Osmosis of the 
Business Judgment Rule
There are a number of ways to protect the corporate directors from frivolous
shareholder litigation. The cleanest and most powerful among them would be by
means of director protection statutes as found in most American states. For instance,
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law authorizes the adoption
by shareholders of the charter provision “eliminating or limiting the personal liability
of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director,” provided that such provision may not apply to (i) “any
breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders,” (ii) “acts
or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law,” (iii) “unlawful payments of dividends or unlawful stock purchases or
redemptions,” and (iv) “any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit.” 
While a detailed analysis of the exact mechanism is beyond the scope of this essay,
adoption of a similar legislative measure would not be inconsistent with the current
statutory provisions of the Korean Commercial Code. The problem, though, is whether
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there is a sufficient political will to make its enactment possible in the foreseeable future. 
But the prospect is bleak. The recent corporate reform measures were adopted in
the midst of an anti-corporate mood following the IMF crisis. Even to this date,
corporate scandals involving huge sums of bribery and consumer fraud make headlines
almost on a daily basis, and valid questions remain as to whether such practices are
indeed leftovers from a bygone era, or a legacy that continues to be popular. Given the
egalitarian bent in current Korean society, big businesses were never in favor in Korea;
the recent and still ongoing rounds of corporate scandals make things worse. Even if a
proposed legislation is narrowly constructed in the mode of Section 102(b)(7) of the
DGCL, it is likely to face a broad-based skepticism and critics will jump on any such
measure as an unfair loophole for the criminally rich.  Briefly put, a prophylactic
approach such as statutory reforms appears to be out of question for the time being.
Another director-protective mechanism would be the D&O insurance.
Unfortunately, however, this market approach will be priced out for most medium-to-
small businesses in Korea. To begin with, the pool of enterprises is not large enough in
Korea to allow precise measurement of risk or support a volume discount in insurance
premiums. Furthermore, given the recent string of judgments against the corporate
directors in the sums of tens of millions of dollars, the insurance premiums have
skyrocketed. At the same time, the medium-to-small businesses are the ones that have
to take the most risks and therefore, need the director liability insurance the most. But
such risk profile will likely raise the premium for them, most often out of the price
range they could afford.
In short, a more tailored and less expensive mechanism is needed to protect the
Korean directors. And in that regard, the judicial approach best fits this profile.  First,
because of the highly selective appointment process based largely on academic
performance and their choice to serve as judges despite the higher salary in the private
sector, judges in Korea command wide respect for their intellectual competence and
moral integrity. Therefore, their decisions, event those that seem to go against the grain
of popular sentiment, are likely to face less resistance, certainly less than any
legislative approach. Second, although the Korean precedents do not have a binding
effect, the judges’ decisions, if they are carefully reasoned, will work as a persuasive
authority on future rulings. Third and most importantly, some of the Korean judges
have already embraced the notion of the business judgment rule at least in its crude,
primitive form. Therefore, there is at least a pre-existing framework into which the rule
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can be incorporated.
An examination of the Korean precedents that discuss the business rule yields two
general observations. First, the precedents for the most part have been lower court
rulings. Therefore, while they do not have much persuasive power yet, as they are
appealed to higher courts, as is often the case, the precedents are likely to increase in
significance. The second observation is that most of the precedents have involved as
defendants the directors of depository institutions. This is because one of the most active
planintiffs has been the Korean Depository Insurance Corporation, which has been
suing banks and other financial entities for improvidently lending money to near-
insolvent corporations, despite the safety and soundness principle governing depository
institutions. One exception among the prominent cases is the case against the directors
of Samsung Electronics, which case is currently pending at the High Court.  
Thus, even where the court decisions appear to incorporate the main points of the
business judgment rule, it is difficult to posit that such precedents apply to the non-
financial companies with equal force since they are diluted by the special concerns for
financial institutions arising out of the safety and soundness principle.  
Furthermore, in terms of actual application, the business judgment rule has faced a
primitive, unprincipled approach. The prime case in point is the Samsung case.94) that
case, the lower court found the directors liable based on sets of facts that decidedly
involved ordinary negligence. On one set of facts, which involved the board of
directors approving the acquisition of a financially troubled company with the stated
business purpose of diversifying into an apparently promising new line of business,
which company was later resold at a loss due to the IMF crisis despite having received
a substantial sum of additional capital investments, the Suwon District court found a
breach of the fiduciary duties of care and diligence in part because (i) the directors
should have foreseen the downturn in the business cycle in the industry to which the
company belonged and therefore should have decided against the acquisition, and (ii)
the defendant directors failed to prove that they had adequately informed themselves of
all the necessary information for deciding the business merit of the question because
they should have paid more attention to the financial statements in order to anticipate
that the target company was unlikely to turn profitable within a foreseeable time frame.  
Another set of facts in the Samsung case involved the board’s decision to buy the
94) See Suwon District Decision No. 98GaHap22533, en banc dated December 27, 2001.
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stock of a company and later resell this stock to an affiliate at a price substantially
lower than the purchase price. Here, the court also found a breach of fiduciary duties
because the sale price approved by the directors was based on what the court
determined to be an erroneous valuation method, despite the fact that (i) such valuation
method was required by law at the time of sale and (ii) the directors relied on a
reputable accounting firm for the calculation of the sale price.  
Either matter involves the kinds of facts that would have been dismissed at the
pleading stage in a U.S. court proceeding. 
In the Samsung case, it is also noteworthy that in both matters, the court took
trouble to analyze the financial statements of the target company in order to
recommend a way to read between the lines (the first set of facts) and to evaluate the
merit (or the lack thereof) of a commonly accepted valuated method by commenting
on esoteric issues such as whether the book or fair market value should be used in
valuing dormant real estate of a company. Again, such endeavor is something that
would have been forestalled at the outset in a U.S. court proceeding for reasons of the
relative expertise of the court and the efficient allocation of judicial resources.
Of course, it will be unfair to evaluate the wisdom of a Korean court’s decision
purely by analogy to a hypothetical ruling in a U.S. court. However, the Samsung
decision clearly and directly contravened the underlying policy rationales of the
business judgment rule, and a defender of the ruling in that case has the burden to
provide a countervailing justification, either in terms of law or policy. Apparently there
was none, and this is a case where even the opponents of the business judgment rule
concede that the court has gone too far.95)
The Samsung case notwithstanding, the Korean courts, especially at the lower trial
level, have referred to the business judgment rule in their decisions. Although these
decisions mostly involved facts of lending decisions by financial institutions, it will be
worthwhile to quote some of such discussions to gain a context on where the business
judgment rule stands in the current jurisprudence of Korea as well as to grasp a sense
of direction of what to expect next.
95) Joo-Young Kim, “People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy”, Q&A session at a symposium on the
limits of the authority and liability of corporate directors sponsored by Korean Depository Insurance Corporation on
September 18, 2003 
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1. Korean Supreme Court Case No. 2000da9086, decided on 
March 15, 2002 96)
This Supreme Court case involved a claim that the officers of a commercial bank
did not diligently perform their fiduciary duties to their corporation when they made a
lending decision to a company that later became insolvent. Here, the court ruled that,
with respect to a business judgment on lending, an officer of a financial institution who
has conducted the loan analysis “in good faith, for the best interests of the company, in
accordance with proper procedures and on the basis of reasonable information in light
of the circumstances and the officer’s position” would be deemed as lying “within the
permitted discretions” and having fulfilled his fiduciary duties unless there was a
“clearly unreasonable” misconduct in the performance of his duties. To determine
whether there was a “clearly unreasonable” misconduct, the court noted that a
comprehensive review of the relevant facts and circumstances, including the terms and
conditions of the loan agreement, the loan size, repayment plan, the security for the
loan, and the debtor company’s asset profile, management history and the growth
potential of company operations. 
The court also noted that the officers and directors of a depository institution have a
special duty to the public for the purposes of maintaining a sound and safe financial
system, harboring at least a seed of doubt as to whether the aforementioned duties
apply to officers and directors of a financial institution only. However, as to the
hypothetical argument that the ruling here applies only to officers rather than directors,
the majority view among commentators is that the same duties apply equally to
directors and senior-ranking officers of a corporation. 
2. Seoul High Court Case No. 2001na59417, decided on November 14, 2002 97)
This appellate decision by the High Court involved a dispute over the lending limit
96) Quoted from Bok-Gi Hong, “The Duties of Directors and Applications of the Business Judgment Rule [isa-ui
uimoo-wa kyungyongpandan-ui wonchik]” , presented at a symposium on the limits of the authority and liability of
corporate directors sponsored by Korean Depository Insurance Corporation on September 18, 2003 (manuscript on file
with author). 
97) Quoted from Hong, supra note 96, at 43.
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set by a merchant bank. The court noted that while the directors of a financial institution
have fiduciary duties that go beyond those applicable to a non-financial company, there
were significant overlaps between them. One such overlap is that a director in making a
business judgment should diligently obtain “easily accessible” information that may
serve as the basis of the business judgment and should not make a “reckless or
arbitrary” decision without first obtaining such information. The court noted that to the
extent that the director acted in accordance with the foregoing precepts, he should be
deemed to have acted within his discretion under the statute and the charter. 
Most importantly for the business judgment rule, the court posited that the
management of an enterprise inherently involves risk-taking, and therefore if a
representative or other director made a judgment and executed such judgment within
the bounds of reason applicable to an executive of a corporation, the director should
not be held liable for harm subsequently suffered by the corporation as a result of such
judgment on the grounds that the director violated his fiduciary duty of care.  
3. Seoul High Court Case No. 2003na12672, decided on July 23, 2003 98)
In a sign of deference to the Supreme Court where similar facts are involved, the
High Court quoted the language of the above-referenced Supreme Court case almost
verbatim in specifying the duties of the officers of a financial institution. 
4. Daegu District Court Case No. 99kahap13533, decided en banc on 
May 30, 2000 99)
This case included a language remarkably similar to that found in the 2002 Seoul
High Court in regards to the evaluation of a business decision on the basis of ex post
facts. Given that the present case was heard before a lower trial court, this incidence
demonstrates the power of persuasion among the Korean courts, despite the lack of a
formal binding effect by a precedent. 
98) See id. at 46.  
99) See id. at 41.
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5. Jeonju District Court Case No. 99kahap6639, decided en banc on 
February 14, 2003 100)
In yet another tribute to the business judgment rule, the ruling in this case was
noteworthy in that it distinguished a breach of the fiduciary duty of care from a mere
error in business judgment. As for the relevant factors in making the distinction, the
court here specified a list that for the most part was incorporated into later rulings by
higher and other lower courts, including the economic situation at the time of the
business decision, the loan size and security, the special circumstances of the business
involved and the procedures taken by the directors and officers in reaching their
business decisions. 
As examined above, the current Korean jurisprudence seems to be receptive
towards the business judgment rule, at least in its primitive form. However, there are
still several deficiencies that require correction. The most glaring of them is the lack of
a decision by the Korean Supreme Court that declares the applicability of the business
judgment rule to non-financial corporations. Currently, a counterargument is possible
on the technical grounds that all of the major cases decided so far that discuss the
business judgment rule have involved financial corporations where special duties
apply to the directors and officers under the principle of safety and soundness.  
The Korean Supreme Court could stamp out such counterarguments by taking an
unequivocally affirmative stand for the broad application of the business judgment
rule. While even a decision by the Korean Supreme Court will not have a formal
binding effect, its stature, coupled with its vested authority to oversee the personnel
decisions of the lower court judges, i.e., promotional matters, should certainly carry
much weight in influencing the future decisions of the lower courts.
Other actions that should be taken by the courts, especially the Korean Supreme
Court, are as follows:
•Distinguish between the breach of the fiduciary duty of care from a
mere error in business judgment. The former should be punished; the
latter should not. The court can effect this principle by refusing to
100) See id. at 44.
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evaluate the merit of a business judgment by the post facto
consequence of such judgment.
•Add substantive muscle to the fiduciary duties of care and diligence.
For instance, the Delaware courts treat reasonable informedness as a
safe harbor in meeting the requirements of the duty of care. A similar
approach should be taken by the Korean courts. If reasonable
informedness is not the appropriate threshold for its lack of statutory
foundation, the courts can use an alternative concept found in Article
382-2 of the Commercial Code, which is the director’s authority to act
within the discretion granted under the statute and the corporate
charter.  Thus, to the extent that the director does not abuse such
discretion, the court should consider exempting him from liability for
an alleged violation of fiduciary duties of care and diligence.
•Hold directors liable for breaches of the duties of care and diligence
only upon finding of gross negligence. Article 401 of the Commercial
Code already codifies such a threshold for third party claims. While
Article 401 of the Commercial Code does not expressly state what
type of negligence a director should be accountable for, it does not
specify “ordinary” negligence and therefore the judge has room to
judicially institute the concept of gross negligence.
•Hold fast to the default rules of evidence. Under the default rules of
evidence, the plaintiff in a civil litigation has the burden of proof for
purposes of both pleading and persuasion. No exception should be
made in derivative litigations for reasons director’s superior access to
information. Such exception may have made sense in the days where
the plaintiff shareholder was also burdened with a harsh standing
requirement. However, with the ease of such restriction following the
post-IMF crisis reforms, the threat of frivolous strike suits has become
real.  In light of this development, procedural equity demands the
restoration of the default rules of evidence in derivative litigation. 
•As a counterbalance, construe strictly any violation of the director’s
duty of loyalty to the corporation or any knowing violation of the law.
Such approach strikes at the heart of the problems for Korean
corporations, namely the misappropriation of corporate funds in the
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form of bribery, embezzlement and commingling, without chilling the
risk-taking activity of the corporate directors, which is governed by
the fiduciary duties of care and diligence.  
The foregoing list is not meant to be comprehensive. But at least, they will be steps
in the right direction in the sense that the law should no longer serve as a disincentive
against the corporate directors from doing their job and fulfilling their fiduciary
obligations to the corporation at the same time.  
V.  Conclusion
The Korean law on corporate governance is still a puzzle in development. As such,
it is still missing critical pieces, among which director-protective mechanisms such as
the business judgment rule stands as one of the most prominent. There is no question
that legal reform is a dynamic process. But given the nature of path dependency, it is
also a time sensitive matter that will much benefit from the correction of its flaws as
early as possible.  
And that is why judicial activism desperately becomes important with respect to the
systematic incorporation of the business judgment rule into Korean law. This is
particularly so in light of the fact that, as media-tainted villains, the corporate
management is likely to be orphans in the legislative process and therefore requires the
intervention of the judges who carry a constitutional mandate to afford equal protection
of the law (in terms of both letters and the spirit) to all, including the corporate
directors. 
Given the structural or other constraints of the Korean statutory framework and the
civil law tradition that effectively marginalizes the role of the judiciary, judicial
activism in Korea is a formidable task.
However, where there is a will, there is a way. Further, given the porous language
of the relevant statutes, the Korean judges have ample room to maneuver. It is time for
them to make their mark on history, even if this means taking a firm stand against the
wave of populist sentiment. 
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